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HAZARDOUS WASTE: THIRD-PARTY
COMPENSATION FOR CONTINGENCIES
ARISING FROM INACTIVE AND
ABANDONED HAZARDOUS WASTE
DISPOSAL SITES
I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly 50,000 uncontrolled inactive1 and abandoned2 haz-
ardous waste disposal sites presently exist in the United States,
many of which pose substantial environmental dangers.3 The
hazardous waste problem, considered by many to be today's
most pressing environmental issue,4 is largely attributable to the
sheer volume of hazardous waste generated by modern industrial
processes. The approximately 750,000 hazardous waste genera-
tors in this country, many of which manufacture useful products
such as medicines, textiles, petroleum products, leather, and
paints,5 annually produce nearly sixty million metric tons of haz-
ardous by-products.6 Unless returned to the cycle of production,
1. A disposal site is inactive when the disposer or other responsible party has dis-
continued operations but still owns or occupies the site. See Hazardous Waste Disposal
Report Together with Additional and Separate Views by the Subcomm. on Oversight
and Investigations in the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1979) (statement of Rep. Albert Gore, Jr.) [hereinafter cited as 1979
Oversight Report].
2. Abandoned sites are those inactive sites for which disposers or other responsible
parties are no longer identifiable. Id.
3. 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 2085 (1979). See notes 12-13 and accompanying text infra
for a discussion of specific dangers posed by these sites.
4. 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 194 (1979); 45 Fed. Reg. 33,084 (1980).
5. OFFICE OF WATER AND WASTE MANAGEMENT, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, EVERYBODY'S PROBLEM: HAZARDOUS WASTE 13 (SW-826) (1980). The societal
utility of some goods produced for a modern throw-away society, such as many plastic
products, may, however, be outweighed by the detriments of their hazardous by-
products.
6. OFFICE OF PUBLIC AWARENESS, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, HAZARD-
ous WASTE-FIFTEEN YEARS AND STILL COUNTING 2 (OPA 98) (1980) [hereinafter cited as
FIFTEEN YEARS]. In South Carolina alone, 800 hazardous waste generators produce three
million tons of hazardous waste annually. South Carolina Department of Health and En-
vironmental Control, Hazardous Waste Generated in South Carolina for 1980 (October
1980) (unofficial report).
543
1
Fulton: Hazardous Waste: Third-Party Compensation for Contingencies Arisi
Published by Scholar Commons, 1982
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
these substances must be disposed of in one form or another.7
Contributing to the problem is the "deplorable practice [of in-
dustry] which has prevailed throughout our history-the prac-
tice of disposing of waste, hazardous or not, in the cheapest and
easiest way possible." Disposal without regard for the environ-
ment, as by indiscriminate dumping, is, of course, the cheapest
approach, and as much as 90% of the hazardous waste generated
has been managed "in a manner which potentially threatens
human health and the environment.""
The costs associated with releases1 ° of hazardous substances
caused by this past mismanagement of waste can be enormous."
These costs fall into two categories, those sustained by the envi-
ronment and the general public and those incurred by individual
third parties. The first class of costs comprises environmental
losses such as the contamination of groundwater, rivers, lakes,
and streams, and the destruction of aquatic life, wildlife, and
vegetation; 2 it also includes the costs of correcting conditions
that threaten public health and the environment. The second
class of costs, sustained by individual third parties, includes loss
of property value, property damage, and physical injury caused
by direct or indirect contacts with hazardous substances.
1 4
7. This is required by the principle of conservation of matter. See 1 F. GRAD, TREA-
TISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4.01(1) (1979). The technology presently exists for re-
claiming and reusing many hazardous wastes. The government's failure to provide incen-
tives for resource recovery, however, has discouraged use of the available technology.
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, DECISION-MAKERS GUIDE IN SOLID WASTE
MANAGEMENT, 126 (SW-500) (1976).
8. FIFTEEN YEARS, supra note 6, at 1.
9. 45 Fed. Reg. 33,084 (1980).
10. A "release" generally includes "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting,
emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the envi-
ronment. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (Supp. 1980).
11. The ultimate cost of remedying problems caused by uncontrolled sites could ap-
proach $50 billion. 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 193 (1979). At Love Canal, near Niagara Falls,
New York, homes and a school were built adjacent to a landfill where hazardous waste
had been buried twenty-five years earlier. As the drums holding the waste corroded, their
contents seeped into yards and basements, forcing evacuation of over 200 families in
1978 and 1979. Residents of the area have exhibited a high incidence of birth defects,
miscarriages, and other maladies. The costs of the Love Canal incident alone may exceed
$20 million. 1979 Oversight Report, supra note 1, at 9-24.
12. Indirect contact can occur through a number of mechanisms such as ground-
water contamination, air pollution, fire and explosion, and surface water, contamination.
13. The Environmental Protection Agency has on file hundreds of cases of harm to
human health, most of which have resulted from the contamination of groundwater-the
drinking water source for one-half of the nation's population. Moreover, vapors from
544 [Vol. 33
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In partial recognition of these costs, state and federal legis-
latures have developed massive hazardous waste regulatory pro-
grams designed to prevent long-range and large-scale environ-
mental pollution and to clean up problem disposal sites. These
programs, however, generally ignore the plight of innocent third
parties victimized by inactive and abandoned waste sites. Fur-
thermore, insurance carried by the victim or the polluter nor-
mally fails to fully compensate these third-party victims. Conse-
quently, for complete recovery for injuries caused by inactive
and abandoned waste sites, victims must seek redress in the
courts.
The common-law approach to recovery for hazardous waste
injuries, however, is riddled with uncertainties. Statutes of limi-
tation and causation problems may present formidable barriers
to recovery. Moreover, the independent contractor rule may in-
hibit recovery from the only parties associated with the harm
who are likely to be solvent, the generators of the injurious
waste. In sum, traditional legal theories are ineffective "for
large-scale pollution affecting large numbers of persons, where
the source is difficult to trace, the causative link is hard to es-
tablish, or public policy is opposed to terminating the polluting
activity or even burdening the polluting enterprise with the full
cost of compensating all damages."'15 In view of these uncertain-
ties, further legislation defining the rights of innocent victims
and the liabilities of hazardous waste polluters is needed.
Because the present hazardous waste regulatory program is
aimed at minimizing the first category of hazardous waste
costs-those of correcting conditions that threaten the public
health and the environment, this Note focuses on the second
category of costs-those incurred by individual third par-
ties-and on the lack of adequate compensation for losses suf-
fered by victims of inactive and abandoned hazardous waste dis-
posal sites, and suggests a need for more protective hazardous
problem disposal sites have been linked to skin diseases, respiratory illnesses, and high
levels of toxic materials in the circulatory systems of humans and livestock. Mismanage-
ment of hazardous waste has also generated poisonous gases, which have injured and
killed firemen and workers and have caused fires and explosions. 45 Fed. Reg. 33,085
(1980).
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3251-3259 (1976).
15. Pfennigstorf, Environment, Damages, and Compensation, 2 AM. B. FOUNDATION
RESEARCH J. 347, 353-54 (1979).
19821
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waste legislation.
II. RECOVERY UNDER EXISTING HAZARDOUS WASTE LEGISLATION
Although Congress initially recognized the hazardous waste
problem in the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965,18 the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (R.C.R.A.) was a serious
attempt to address the problem.' 7 R.C.R.A. was designed to "es-
tablish the statutory framework for a national system which
would insure the proper management of hazardous waste."'18
Subtitle C of the Act grants authority to the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to develop regulations that further the
aims of R.C.R.A. and authorizes the development and imple-
mentation of state programs in lieu of the federal plan.19 As a
result, massive regulatory packages have been developed at the
state and federal level. These programs establish performance
standards for generators, transporters, and.hazardous waste fa-
cility operators; 20 utilize "cradle-to-grave" manifest systems that
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976).
17. 45 Fed. Reg. 33,085 (1980).
18. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922, 6926 (1976). A preference for state administration is indi-
cated by the R.C.R.A.'s legislative history. See H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
11, 24, 29-33 (1976).
EPA authorization of a state's program is contingent on the satisfaction of three
criteria: 1) equivalence to the federal program; 2) consistency with the federal program
and other authorized state programs; and 3) adequate enforcement of compliance. 42
U.S.C. § 6926 (1976). States that had developed hazardous waste programs before the
promulgation of federal regulations, however, could be granted authorization for a two-
year interim period upon a showing of substantial equivalence to the federal program. Id.
EPA has granted interim authorization for hazardous waste programs in Alabama, Ar-
kansas, Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Vermont. THE
JOURNAL, Apr., 1981, at 6 (news publication of the South Carolina Association of Indus-
trial Waste Disposers).
19. Hazardous waste facilities are operations that treat, store, or dispose of hazard-
ous waste. 40 C.F.R. § 260.10(21) (1980).
20. In May 1980, EPA issued its first phase of hazardous waste regulations. 40
C.F.R. §§ 260-265 (1980). EPA's regulations are supported by the R.C.R.A.'s enforce-
ment provisions, which provide for civil penalties of not more than $25,000 for each day
of noncompliance and criminal sanctions in the event of wilful noncompliance. 42 U.S.C.
§ 6928 (1976).
The hazardous waste program in South Carolina is representative of the state pro-
grams that have received interim authorization from the EPA. See South Carolina Haz-
ardous Waste Management Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-56-10 to -190 (Supp. 1980); S.C.
Dep't of Health and Environmental Control R., S.C. CODE ANN. (R. & REG.) 61-79 to 61-
79.11 (Supp. 1980) (the South Carolina Hazardous Waste Management Regulations). Be-
[Vol. 33
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track wastes from point of origin to final disposition; authorize
the transportation, treatment, storage or disposal of hazardous
waste only by permit; and impose reporting, recordkeeping, and
monitoring requirements on hazardous waste managers. 21
The regulatory program developed under R.C.R.A. makes
significant advances toward "a national system which would in-
sure the proper management of hazardous waste,"22 but because
R.C.R.A. was enacted before "the Love Canal tragedy forced our
attention on the magnitude of the residues of past neglect,"2 3 its
remedy is incomplete. The Act is prospective in nature and is
directed at existing and future hazardous waste management fa-
cilities. Thus, it fails to address the substantial hazards posed by
inactive and abandoned sites.24
The recently proposed federal financial responsibility stan-
dards for hazardous waste facilities 25 are indicative of this over-
sight. These standards are designed to assure
cause the state's regulations were fashioned from federal guidelines and because substan-
tial equivalence to the federal program is required for interim authorization, the state
program is nearly identical to its federal counterpart.
21. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
22. FIFTzN YEARS, supra note 6, at 2.
23. 126 CONG. REC. H9159 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Gore); Cohen
& Derkics, Financial Responsibility for Hazardous Waste Sites, 9 CAP. U.L. REV. 509,
520 (1980). The R.C.R.A.'s "imminent hazard" provision, 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1976), which
allows the Administrator of EPA to bring suit to restrain persons whose disposal of waste
presents an imminent hazard to health or the environment, or "to take such other action
as may be necessary," but limits the possible action to remedial efforts in cases when the
party responsible for the waste site is available and solvent. It cannot be used to com-
pensate third-party victims of inactive and abandoned sites, therefore, but may be useful
in cleaning up some nonabandoned, inactive sites.
R.C.R.A.'s failure adequately to address the problem of inactive sites is not its only
shortcoming. It does not effectively attack the hazardous waste problem at its source: the
annual generation of sixty million metric tons of hazardous waste. The Act does not
encourage or compel efficiency in production processes that will lead to decreased output
of waste. Although the legislation is entitled the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, the -rogram it created has thus far emphasized disposal rather than conservation
and recovery. The only incentive presently provided for recycling and reclaiming waste is
avoidance of the costs of disposal and the costs of complying with the regulations. Those
wastes that are reused or reclaimed are excused from regulation. 40 C.F.R. § 261.6
(1980).
24. 46 Fed. Reg. 2851-88 (1981) (to be codified 40 C.F.R. §§ 264, 265). These regula-
tions were implemented October 13, 1981. 5 CH m. REG. REP. (BNA) 170 (1981). Finan-
cial responsibility standards are currently in effect in some states. E.g., S.C. Dep't of
Health and Environmental Control R., S.C. CODE ANN. (R & REG.) 61-79.5 (Supp. 1980).
25. 46 Fed. Reg. 2821 (1981).
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(1) that funds will be available for proper closure of facilities
that treat, store, or dispose of hazardous waste and for post-
closure care of hazardous waste disposal sites; and (2) that a
pool of funds will be available during the operating life of the
facility from which third parties can seek compensation for in-
juries to people and property resulting from operation of the
facilities.2"
Although these provisions improve the possibilities of recovery
for injuries arising from active disposal facilities, they offer no
relief for the victims of inactive and abandoned sites.2 7
Congressional recognition of the inadequacy of R.C.R.A. led
to enactment of the Comprehensive Environmental Responses,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980.28 This Act attempts to
fill the gaps left by R.C.R.A. by creating a $1.6 billion hazardous
waste "Superfund, ' 29 financed primarily by an excise tax on
26. The new administration of the Environmental Protection Agency is at present
considering a proposal to suspend permanently the federal requirements for liability in-
surance, leaving to the states the task of regulating insurance requirements. 12 ENVIR.
REP. (BNA) 557 (1981). Because adoption of this proposal might place victims of existing
permitted disposal sites in much the same situation as victims of abandoned and inactive
sites-unable to obtain compensation because of the polluter's insufficient assets-it
may constitute a "major crippling of R.C.R.A., and a major setback in the [federal] regu-
latory program ...." Id.
27. 92 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (Supp. 1980).
28. See WASTE AGE, Jan. 1981, at 20; SOLID WASTES MANAGEMENT, Jan. 1981, at 18.
The Act creates two funds, a general response fund (Superfund) and a $200 million post-
closure liability fund financed by a $2.13 tax on each ton of hazardous waste disposed of
at permitted facilities. The post-closure fund will be used to clean up releases from
closed permitted facilities, to pay for damages to natural resources up to $50 million, and
to compensate for injury or property loss resulting from such releases.
29. See 126 CONG. REc. H9159 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Gore).
The fee system established by Superfund reflects a congressional attitude that the indus-
try which benefited from and was primarily responsible for past mismanagement of haz-
ardous waste, rather than the general public, should bear the brunt of clean up costs.
The chemical industry will pass on the costs of fund contributions to consumers of their
products who presumably have also benefited from past inexpensive disposal practices.
Although the chemical industry is responsible for the problem, many individual
manufacturers may not have contributed to the problem. This fact has led to criticism
that the bill punishes "the innocent along with the guilty," id. at H9160 (remarks of Rep.
Broyhill), and may lead to constitutional challenge of the Act. The Chemical Manufac-
turers Association, in a statement presented to the Senate Committee on Environment
and Public Works, argued that this type of fee system amounts to an unconstitutional
bill of attainder because "it applies to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a
way as to inflict punishment on them without judicial trial." Note, Superfund Proposed
to Clean Up Hazardous Waste Disasters, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 615, 620 n.45 (1980)
(citing CMA AND SUPERFUND (July 19, 1979)).
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crude oil, petrochemical feedstocks, and certain inorganic toxic
substances. The Superfund is to be used to defray the costs of
cleaning up inactive and abandoned hazardous waste sites30 and
to pay for damages to natural resources caused by the release of
waste from these sites. Under the Act, operators of problem dis-
posal sites, transporters of waste to the sites, and generators of
substances found at the sites are held strictly liable to the fund
for any disbursement made.$'
Certainly, Superfund is a step toward the resolution of some
of the difficulties presented by inactive and abandoned hazard-
ous waste sites, but it fails to compensate private parties for per-
sonal injuries and property damages caused by releases from in-
active and abandoned sites.s2 In this respect, Superfund
represents a substantial compromise of the original contingency
fund proposals. Several of the Superfund packages that were in-
troduced provided substantial relief for third parties,33 but Con-
30. The Act authorizes the President to initiate removal or remedial actions when
the release of hazardous substances imminently and substantially endangers the public
health or welfare. Section 101 of the Act defines "removal" as "the clean up or removal
of released hazardous substances. . ., such actions ... necessary to monitor, assess, and
evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances, the disposal of removed
material, or the taking of such other actions as may be necessary ... [to protect]...
public health ... [and] ... the environment." 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (Supp. 1980). Remedial
action "means those actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in
addition to removal actions .... to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous sub-
stances so that they do not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future
public health or welfare or the environment." The latter term includes such activities as
storage and confinement of wastes, on-site treatment and incineration, repair of leaking
containers, any necessary monitoring, and, in some instances, the costs of permanently
relocating residents and businesses. Id. This final element is an obvious response to the
Love Canal calamity. See note 11 supra.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (Supp. 1980). This cause of action reflects congressional recog-
nition "that actions involving hazardous waste. . . [constitute] abnormally dangerous or
ultrahazardous activity sufficient to subject a responsible party to strict liability." 126
CONG. REc. H9462 (1980) (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Gore). The Act
limits the liability of most transporters to $50 million and the liability of other defen-
dants to the total costs of response plus $50 million.
32. The only provision under the Act that may be of some value to third parties
allows fund expenditures for epidemiologic studies, health effect studies and diagnostic
services. These activities may offer some relief from the difficult task of showing a causal
relationship between exposure to a particular waste and an adverse health effect. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 9604(i), 9611(c)(4) (Supp. 1980).
33. The Superfund legislation introduced by the Carter Administration offered lim-
ited compensation for property and economic damages to third parties. See S. 1341, 96th
Cong., 1stSess., 125 CONG. REc. S7694 (daily ed. June 14, 1979). The Environmental
Response Act, introduced by Senators Muskie and Culver, would have compensated per-
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gress, dissuaded by the level at which the fund would have to be
maintained in order to compensate victims, rejected those
proposals."'
This reluctance to provide legislative relief for victims of in-
active and abandoned hazardous waste sites also prevails at the
state level. 5 Only four states have enacted legislation designed,
at least in part, to compensate third-party victims.3 6 Oregon and
Alaska each have provided waste victims with a statutory cause
of action against hazardous waste polluters. The Oregon law,s7
which is the more limited of the two laws, requires a showing
that the person in control of the injurious waste violated a law
or acted unreasonably in handling the waste. By requiring a
showing that the polluter's conduct was not normal or reasona-
ble, the statute in effect requires a plaintiff to establish a cause
of action in negligence against the polluter.38 The Alaska stat-
ute3" goes further, holding a polluter strictly liable for damages
sonal injuries, property loss, and out-of-pocket medical expenses and would have pro-
vided relaxed causation requirements for victims of hazardous waste-related injuries. See
S. 1480, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S9179 (daily ed. July 11, 1979). Congress-
man LaFalce, whose congressional district includes the Love Canal site in Niagara Falls,
New York, introduced a number of bills that proposed, among other things, a statutory
cause of action for hazardous waste victims, a compensation fund for victims, and an
ameliorated causation standard and statute of limitation. For a discussion of the Con-
gressman's proposals, see Cohen & Derkics, supra note 23, at 522-24.
34. Sponsors of the bill were able to obtain its passage only by cutting the fund back
to $1.6 billion from an originally proposed $4.2 billion, by eliminating provisions estab-
lishing joint and several liability for parties connected with problem sites, and by delet-
ing the section allowing compensation for personal injuries and property damages. SOLID
WASTES MANAGEMENT, Jan. 1981, at 18.
35. For a survey of state hazardous waste programs, see Cohen, New Developments
in State Hazardous Waste Legislation, 9 CAP. U.L. REv. 489 (1980).
36. See id.
37. OR. REV. STAT. § 459.685 (1979). The statute provides inter alia that
[alny person having the care, custody or control of a hazardous waste.., who
causes or permits any disposal of such waste. . . in violation of law or other-
wise than as reasonably intended for normal. . .handling of such waste ...
shall be liable for the damages to person or property, public or private, caused
by such disposition.
38. Prevailing in hazardous waste litigation on a negligence theory may be difficult.
See note 86 infra.
39. ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.822 (1977) provides inter alia that "a person owning or
having control over a hazardous substance which enters in or upon the waters, surface or
subsurface lands of the state is strictly liable, without regard to fault, for the damages to
persons or property, public or private, caused by the entry."
A "hazardous substance" is defined by the Act to include "an element or compound
which, when it enters in or upon the waters or surface or subsurface lands of the state,
550 [Vol. 33
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to persons or property caused by the discharge of a hazardous
substance over which he had control. Although these statutes,
particularly the Alaska provision, may be of significant utility to
waste victims in some cases, the remedy they provide may be
incomplete. Because both acts consider as defendants only per-
sons "in control" of the waste at the time of discharge, the ac-
tion may not extend to generators of wastes who no longer have
direct control.40  Consequently, when the person who "con-
trolled" the waste is unknown or insolvent, as is usually the case
with abandoned sites, recovery may not be possible under either
the Oregon or Alaska statutes.
Two other states, South Carolina and New Jersey, have es-
tablished administrative funds similar to the Superfund that
may provide relief for third-party hazardous waste victims. The
South Carolina Hazardous Waste Fund41 allows for compensa-
tion of victims of "preexisting abandoned" sites upon a showing
that a good faith effort has been made to secure and enforce a
valid judgment against the responsible party.4 2 This approach,
although helpful, is insufficient because it requires claimants to
suffer the expense and uncertainty of litigation to avail them-
selves of the fund.43 As a result, low income victims who are una-
presents an imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare...." Id.
§ 46.03.826(3)(A).
40. An argument can be made under the Alaska statute that a generator still "owns"
his wastes even though another party disposes of them for him. See id. § 46.03.826(5).
41. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-56-160 to -190 (Supp. 1980). The South Carolina fund as
initially created was a post-closure fund. Act 517, however, provided that
in the event a national hazardous waste fund is created by federal statute...
[t]he [South Carolina] contingency fund ... shall ... become the South Car-
olina Hazardous Waste Fund to be used by the Department to defray the cost
of mitigating any problems caused by preexisting abandoned hazardous waste
storage or disposal sites.
Id. at § 44-56-160. Given the recent enactment of Superfund, the state fund is presuma-
bly now available for meeting contingencies arising from preexisting abandoned sites.
The $40 million fund is to be financed by a $1.50 per ton tax imposed upon generators
within the state and a $2.00 per ton tax imposed on in-state hazardous landfills for out-
of-state wastes received. See id. at § 44-56-170.
42. Upon such a showing, a victim may recover as much as $500,000 or ten percent
of the fund. See S.C. Dep't of Health & Environmental Control R., S.C. CODE ANN. (R &
REn.) 61-79.5C(2)(e)(iii) (Supp. 1980).
43. Because in most jurisdictions process can be served by publication when defen-
dants cannot be personally served, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-9-720 (1976), and such ser-
vice can provide a basis for default judgment, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-35-340 (1976),
litigation would seem to be required in most instances as a condition of recovery from
the fund.
9
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ble to finance an action in court may be unable to obtain com-
pensation. Furthermore, because the fund is limited to
contingencies that arise from "preexisting abandoned" sites,
strict construction of this language may make the fund unavaila-
ble to victims of inactive sites whose polluters are identifiable
but insolvent.
The New Jersey Spill Compensation Act44 established a
fund financed mainly by a tax on petroleum and petroleum
products to compensate direct and indirect damages caused by
the discharge of "hazardous substances." 45 Although this fund
was apparently created primarily as a measure against oil spills,
its coverage may be broad enough to include at least some haz-
ardous waste injuries. 48 Unlike the South Carolina Fund, the
New Jersey fund does not require that a plaintiff seek and en-
force a judgment as a condition of recovery.
The propriety of these funds is drawn into question by a
provision in the Superfund Act that may preempt maintenance
of such funds by the states:
Except as provided in this Act, no person may be required to
contribute to any fund, the purpose of which is to pay compen-
sation for claims for any costs of response or damage or claims
which may be compensated under this title. Nothing in this
section shall preclude any State from using general revenues
for such a fund, or from imposing a tax or fee upon any person
or upon any substance in order to finance the purchase or pre-
positioning of hazardous substance response equipment or
other preparations for the response to a release of hazardous
substances which affects such State.47
The prohibition of required contribution to compensatory funds
might be interpreted as merely proscribing similarly financed
funds that compensate for the same injuries as Superfund. This
interpretation suggests a congressional desire to avoid duplica-
tion of effort rather than to secure wholesale elimination of state
44. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11g, h (Supp. 1980).
45. Id. § 58:10-23.11a.
46. The Act defines "hazardous substances" as petroleum products and the list of
hazardous substances adopted by the EPA under the Clear Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251 (1977). N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10:23.11(b) (Supp. 1980). Because many of the waste
substances regulated under R.C.R.A. are also considered hazardous under the Clean
Water Act, the fund may be available to many hazardous waste victims.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 9614(c) (Supp. 1980).
[Vol. 33
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funds. Therefore, because private parties are not compensated
by Superfund, state funds established for that purpose may not
be barred even though financed by the levy of a tax or fee upon
the same industrial community that contributes to the
Superfund.45
Alternatively, "compensation for claims for any costs of re-
Sponse or damage or claims. . . under this title" might be con-
strued as a much broader prohibition that precludes all similarly
financed contingency funds regardless of their focus. The scope
of the provision is presently being litigated in New Jersey v.
United States,9 a declaratory judgment action brought to test
the validity of New Jersey's compensation fund. In any event,
funds financed by means other than an industrial tax or fee,
such as by general revenues or by fines, are permitted by the
provision.
III. INSURANCE COVERAGE
Because environmental pollution causes widespread damage
and injury and often leads to complex and costly litigation con-
cerning the interests of multiple parties, the insurance industry
has been reluctant to provide specific coverage for pollution-
related damages.50 Nevertheless, in some instances, hazardous
waste victims may be afforded limited recovery under their own
policies or under a policy held by the polluter. This section con-
siders the availability of recovery for hazardous waste injuries
under three types of policies: 1) a health and accident policy
held by the victim, 2) a property insurance policy held by the
victim, and 3) the polluter's general liability coverage.
A. Threshold Issues
As a preliminary matter, a hazardous waste victim seeking
48. States should be wary of creating funds that have some purposes which overlap
with Superfund and some which do not. To ensure that the legitimate purposes are not
preempted, it is advisable 1) to attach a severability clause to the provisions creating the
fund specifying that the fund is to continue for its lawful purposes even if several of its
purposes are found unlawful, or 2) to indicate that the fund is for purposes not covered
by other funds. For an example of the latter, see S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-56-160 (Supp.
1980).
49. No. 81-0945 (D.D.C., filed Apr. 21, 1981).
50. See Hourihan, Insurance Coverage for Environmental Damage Claims, 15 Fo-
RUM 551, 552 (1980).
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insurance recovery must overcome several barriers. First, an in-
surance policy must exist against which a claim can be asserted.
Although many Americans carry some kind of health coverage,51
many others, particularly members of lower income groups, do
not.5 2 Those persons who do not carry health insurance probably
also do not have property insurance. Second, in cases in which
recovery is to be predicated on a polluter's general liability cov-
erage, it may be difficult to locate the waste disposer to deter-
mine the existence of liability coverage, particularly if the of-
fending site is abandoned. Third, even if an insurance policy
exists, the claimant must establish that the damage occurred
within the policy period. Under most policies, those damages
and injuries originating before5" or after"' the effective date of
the policy are not covered.55 Because the harmful effects of mis-
management of hazardous waste may not surface until years af-
ter the disposal of the materials, the occurrence of the harm
during the policy period may be difficult to prove.56 Finally, a
claimant must be able to show that the type and cause of his
injury are within the terms of the particular policy.
51. Pfennigstorf, supra note 15, at 421.
52. Because most Americans who have health insurance are covered by group health
insurance programs, persons not working are less likely to own health insurance. Id.
53. E.g., Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Nicholson, 246 Ark. 570, 439 S.W.2d 648 (1969);
Pearce v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 259 So. 2d 81 (La. App. 1972).
54. E.g., Illinois Produce Int'l, Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 388 F. Supp. 29 (N.D. Ill.
1975); Rydman v. Martinolich Shipbuilding Corp., 13 Wash. App. 150, 534 P.2d 62
(1975).
55. Hourihan, supra note 50, at 559.
56. With first-party coverage held by the victim, an important issue is whether the
illness or property damage caused by wastes originated before the effective date of the
policy. 43 Ar. JUR. 2D Insurance § 1209 (1969). In determining the availability of cover-
age, however, a policy is normally construed favorably to the insured, and the illness or
damage is deemed to have originated at the time it first manifests itself. See, e.g., Coxen
v. Western Empire Life Ins. Co., 168 Colo. 444, 452 P.2d 16 (1969); Mayer v. Credit Life
Ins. Co., 42 Mich. App. 648, 202 N.W.2d 521 (1972).
Because liability policies generally cover only property damage and bodily injuries
that occur during the policy period, see 3 R. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE
App. 59-60 (1980), a central question concerning third-party coverage is whether the
damage occurred before the expiration of the policy. Because the dangers caused by inac-
tive and abandoned hazardous waste sites often arise years after active use of the sites
has ceased, an occurrence during the policy is especially difficult to establish.
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B. Victims' First-Party Coverage57
Health and accident policies, typically written on an "all
risks" basis, normally provide benefits for accident, sickness, or
death without regard to the cause of the injury.58 The available
benefits, however, are limited in two respects. First, because
most policies put ceilings on the amount of recovery possible, a
hazardous waste victim may not be compensated to the full ex-
tent of his injury.59 Second, health and accident policies nor-
mally cover only medical and hospital expenses and do not pro-
vide compensation for nonpecuniary damages such as pain,
suffering, and disfigurement; for the psychological effects of pol-
lution such as annoyance, irritation, and anxiety; or for loss of
income resulting from acute sickness or long-term disability.60
Recovery for hazardous waste-related damages is even less
likely under a property insurance policy. In contrast to the "all
risks" approach found in health and accident policies, property
insurance is cause oriented and protects a wide range of prop-
erty interests against specifically enumerated perils such as fire,
theft, and damage caused by natural forces."' Because typical
property insurance policies do not expressly insure against pol-
lution,62 property damages caused by hazardous wastes usually
are not covered. Furthermore, even if recovery were available
under a property insurance policy, the recovery is limited by the
typical policy's failure to compensate for loss of use and enjoy-
ment of property 3 or reductions in property value. 4
57. From the victim's point of view, first-party coverage is preferable; not only does
it directly indemnify him for his losses, as opposed to the indirect recovery provided by
third-party liability policies, but it also provides the only source of compensation when
no valid claim exists under common law or statute. Pfennigstorf, supra note 15, at 419.
58. Id. at 420.
59. Health and accident policies provide for the payment of limited sums for enu-
merated injuries. 44 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 1594 (1969). See also 1 J. APPLEMAN, INSUR-
ANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 353 (1965).
60. Pfennigstorf, supra note 15, at 421.
61. Id. at 422. See also 44 Am. JUR. 2D Insurance §§ 1347, 1392, 1399, 1405 (1969).
62. Pfennigstorf, supra note 15, at 422.
63. See, e.g., Darvie v. American Bankers Ins. Co., 80 So. 2d 541 (La. App. 1955);
Housner v. Baltimore-American Ins. Co., 205 Wis. 23, 236 N.W. 546 (1931).
64. Pfennigstorf, supra note 15, at 430.
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C. Third-Party Liability Coverage
A standard clause of general liability insurance policies car-
ried by businesses provides that "[t]he [insurer] will pay on be-
half of the insured all sums which the insured shall become le-
gally liable to pay as damages because of. A. Bodily injury, or,
B. Property damage to which this insurance applies caused by
an occurrence. ' 65 Current policies define an occurrence as "an
accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to condi-
tions, which results in bodily injury or property damage neither
expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.
'6
6
The critical question in determining the availability of recovery
for hazardous waste-related injuries under this type of policy is
whether the insured business expected or intended the release of
hazardous waste from the disposal site.
Generally, because an insured is held to expect the natural
and foreseeable consequences of his voluntary conduct, these
consequences are not covered by liability insurance.6 7 Thus, in
Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Frankfort,"8 a case factually
analogous to the hazardous waste disposal situation, the Ken-
65. 3 R. LONG, supra note 56, at App. 31.
66. Id. at App. 60. This is standard language in policies written after 1973. Id. Poli-
cies written before 1973 cover either bodily injury and property damage caused by "acci-
dent", see Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 1048 n.2 (1964), or damages caused by an "occurrence,"
defined as "an accident, including injurious exposure to conditions, which results, during
the policy period, in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended
from the standpoint of the insured." 3 R. LONG, supra note 54, at App. 59. Because
neither of these provisions includes language such as "an accident including continuous
or repeated exposure to conditions . . .," which is found in post-1973 policies, id., the
question of whether the older policies cover injuries caused by continuous or repeated
exposure to hazardous conditions or only the more sudden accidents or occurrences is a
source of potential controversy.
Liability policies covering damages caused "by accident" are generally held not to
apply to injuries caused by continuous exposure to injurious conditions. See, e.g., Leggett
v. Home Indem. Co., 461 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1972); Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Frankfort,
516 S.W.2d 859 (Ky. 1974). But see White v. Smith, 440 S.W.2d 497 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969).'
An "occurrence" under older policies generally has been construed as a broader term
than "accident," broad enough to encompass continuous or repeated exposures to haz-
ardous conditions. See, e.g., Tennessee Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 463
F.2d 548 (5th Cir. 1972); Grand River Lime Co. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 32 Ohio App. 2d
178, 289 N.E.2d 360 (1972).
67. 1 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 59, at § 4492.02.
68. 516 S.W.2d 859 (Ky. 1974). For other cases in which foreseeable environmental
harm has been found not covered by general liability policies, see Leggett v. Home In-
dem. Co., 461 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1972); Clark v. London & Lancashire Indem. Co. of
America, 21 Wis. 2d 268, 124 N.W.2d 29 (1963).
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tucky Court of Appeals held that when city employees operated
a dump in a way that caused, as a natural and ordinary conse-
quence, refuse to be pushed and spilled upon the land of an-
other, the encroachment could be characterized as neither unin-
tentional nor unforeseeable, and no recovery could be had under
the city's liability insurance policy. Because damages that flow
from improper disposal of hazardous waste are at least arguably
foreseeable to the disposer, under the reasoning in Frankfort,
the polluter's insurance company may be able to avoid
liability. 9
Recovery under a waste disposer's liability insurance policy
also may be avoided if the policy contains a "contamination ex-
clusion" or "pollution exclusion" clause.70 These provisions typi-
cally exclude property damages and damages for bodily injuries
"arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of
smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, li-
quids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants
or pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water-
course or body of water .... ,,71 These exclusions normally do
not deny coverage when discharge or release is "sudden and ac-
cidental, '72 but because many hazardous waste contingencies
arise over a period of time rather than as a sudden event, these
exclusions may nevertheless defeat claims for damages caused
by hazardous waste.
Apart from these difficulties, effective liability coverage may
be unavailable because injuries arising from inactive and aban-
doned hazardous waste sites may not surface until years after
active use of the site has ceased. Thus, like first-party insurance,
third-party liability coverage may fail to afford complete recov-
ery to the victims of inactive and abandoned hazardous waste
sites. 3 Consequently, for full relief, victims must seek redress in
69. 516 S.W.2d at 860.
70. These exclusions are standard in policies written after 1973. See 3 R. LoNG,
supra note 56, at App. 67-68.
71. Id. at App. 68. For cases considering pollution exclusions, see Molton, Allen &
Williams, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d 95 (Ala. 1977); Pepper
Indus., Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 67 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 134 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1977).
72. 3 R. LONG, supra note 56, at App. 68.
73. It should be recognized, however, that although liability policies held by persons
responsible for inactive hazardous waste sites may not cover waste-related injuries, such
coverage is presently available. See Pfennigstorf, supra note 15, at 442-44; Hourihan,
supra note 50, at 553.
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the courts.
IV. HAZARDOUS WASTE LITIGATION
Parties seeking tort recovery for injuries to person or prop-
erty caused by inactive and abandoned hazardous waste sites en-
counter several substantial barriers. First, because inactive site
problems often do not arise until well after a site's active use has
ceased,74 a plaintiff's claim may be barred by a statute of limita-
tion. Further, because the parties primarily responsible for inac-
tive and abandoned sites are often minimally solvent or insol-
vent75 or are outside the jurisdiction of the court, it may be
difficult to locate a financially responsible defendant against
whom an actionable claim can be asserted. Finally, in hazardous
waste litigation, it may be particularly difficult to show a direct
causal relationship between the plaintiff's injury and the defen-
dant's culpable conduct.
A. Statutes of Limitation
Statutes of limitation play an important role in the legal
system; they bar claims that, due to the passage of time, may
prove indefensible because memories have faded, witnesses have
died or disappeared, and evidence has been lost.7 1 Statutes in
most jurisdictions provide that an action must be brought within
a specified time after the cause or right of action has accrued.
77
In the usual tort case, determination of the time of accrual of a
cause of action creates no difficulty because the tortious act and
the resulting injury occur in close proximity. In hazardous waste
74. Recognition that subsoil migration of toxic materials has contaminated a well or
that a person's health has been adversely affected by the consumption of contaminated
water may not occur until years after the materials were improperly disposed of.
75. Before establishment of federal and state financial responsibility requirements,
those primarily responsible for hazardous waste sites, the disposers and transporters,
often were minimally solvent operations. In South Carolina, six of the state's seven worst
hazardous waste sites are inactive and insolvent or abandoned. Interview with John T.
Buchanan, Director of Enforcement Division of Bureau of Solid and Hazardous Waste
Management, South Carolina Dep't of Health and Environmental Control, in Columbia,
S.C. (Aug. 4, 1981).
76. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-
49 (1944).
77. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-20 (1976). Other states have enacted similar statutes.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-2-30 (1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-1 (1970). Under these stat-
utes, the limitation period for most tort actions is six years.
[Vol. 33
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cases, however, a substantial period of time may elapse between
release of waste and subsequent manifestation of injury, and
precise determination of the time of accrual may therefore be
difficult.
The accrual of a toxic tort action may be fixed at several
different times: 1) when thle tortious conduct occurred, 2) when
the injury first manifested itself, or 3) when the victim first dis-
covered or reasonably should have discovered that the injury re-
sulted from the defendant's tortious conduct.78 As a general rule,
tort actions run from the time of the tortious conduct rather
than from the point of discovery of the injury or of the defen-
dant's culpability.7 9 Under this rule, an action against a hazard-
ous waste polluter would run from the time of improper dispo-
sal, which may have occurred many years before discovery of the
harm.
When the injury is likely to go undiscovered beyond the
statutory period, some courts have been reluctant to apply the
general rule mechanically, finding instead that an action runs
from the time the injury is discovered.80 This "discovery" rule
arose from the recognition that victims of inherently unknow-
able dangers should have their day in court,81 and it has been
applied in cases considering latent injuries to property82 and
persons.83
Although it is more protective of plaintiffs than the strict
78. Birnbaum, Statutes of Limitations Problems in Environmental Tort Suits, in
Toxic TORTS 412 (P. Rheingold ed. 1977).
79. See, e.g., Warren v. United States, 199 F. 753 (5th Cir. 1912); Brown v. Finger,
240 S.C. 102, 124 S.E.2d 781 (1962).
80. See, e.g., Gattis v. Chavez, 413 F. Supp. 33 (D.S.C. 1976). The district court
recognized the adoption of the "discovery rule" for interpreting statutes of limitation as
a growing trend in the law. Id. at 38.
81. Note, Medical Malpractice Statutes of Limitations: Uniform Extension of the
Discovery Rule, 55 IowA L. REv. 486, 489 (1969).
82. See, e.g., McCurley v. South Carolina State Highway Dep't, 256 S.C. 332, 182
S.E.2d 299 (1971); Conestee Mills v. Greenville, 160 S.C. 10, 158 S.E. 113 (1931); Sutton
v. Catawba Power Co., 104 S.C. 405, 89 S.E. 353 (1916). In McCurley and Conestee, the
court used a continuing nuisance theory to allow plaintiffs to recover for the impairment
of property despite the prior running of the statute. According to these cases, a continu-
ing cause of action accrues if injury to property is suffered because of another's negli-
gence and the cause is abatable. If the injury occurs within the statutory period, the
injured party may sue at any time injury is discovered. Sutton also supports application
of the discovery rule in cases involving latent injuries to land.
83. See, e.g., Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949); Karjala v. Johns-Manville
Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975).
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accrual rule, the discovery rule may fail to produce an equitable
result when the discovery of injury and the discovery of causal
relationship do not occur simultaneously. In hazardous waste
cases, a victim who has contracted a chronic illness as a result of
exposure to carcinogens released from a waste disposal site may
discover the release or the connection between the release and
his injury long after the initial diagnosis of his illness. Consider-
ing this problem in the analogous context of long-term reaction
to prescription drugs, several courts have concluded that a cause
of action does not accrue "until the plaintiff discovers or in the
exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered not only
that he has been injured but also that his injury may have been
caused by the defendant's conduct.
84
- Because of the inequity that would result from barring re-
covery by a waste victim who could not have learned of his in-
jury or the defendant's culpability until after expiration of the
period of limitation, application of the cause and effect discovery
rule or at least the injury discovery rule seems appropriate. The
reluctance of some courts to abandon the traditional accrual rule
because of the policies behind enforcement of limitation peri-
ods,85 however, renders uncertain the applicability of the more
liberal approaches in hazardous waste cases.
B. Finding a Defendant
Apart from the substantial obstacles presented by statutes
of limitation, a plaintiff seeking damages for injuries caused by
hazardous waste must identify a financially responsible defen-
dant against whom an'action can be asserted. Although the
party directly responsible for an inactive waste site-the dumper
or disposer-may be ascertainable and solvent,86 he is more
84. Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. 164, 171, 371 A.2d 170, 174 (1977).
85. See notes 76 & 79 and accompanying text supra.
86. Several tort theories, including trespass, negligence, nuisance and strict liability,
are potentially applicable against ascertained hazardous waste dumpers and disposers.
The effectiveness of these theories in inactive site cases is largely speculative because of
the limited amount of litigation. Commentators generally agree that, of the four theories,
trespass and negligence are least likely to succeed in hazardous waste and analogous
litigation and that nuisance law and strict liability, although limited in several respects,
have the greatest potential for actions of this type. Commentators also generally agree
that, given the speculative applicability of these theories, some victims of inactive and
abandoned sites may be without remedy even though the party directly responsible for
[Vol. 33
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often unidentifiable, minimally solvent, insolvent, or has left the
jurisdiction. 7 The plaintiff can therefore improve the chance of
recovery by implicating the generators of the injury-producing
wastes, who are more likely to be solvent. Recovery against haz-
ardous waste generators, however, is seriously complicated by
the independent contractor rule of tort law.88
In many cases, hazardous wastes are transported and dis-
posed of by parties independent of the waste generator and over
whom the generator has little or no right of control regarding
the details of the work to be done. Because these independent
contractors 9 are not merely an extension of the waste generator
but conduct their own enterprise and control its manner of oper-
ation, they rather than the generator will normally be liable for
torts committed in performance of their work.90 Thus, the inde-
their harm has been ascertained. For more complete discussion of the merits and defi-
ciencies of these tort causes of action in environmental and hazardous waste litigation,
see COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HAZARDOUS WASTE SrrS
POSE INVESTIGATION, EVALUATION, SCIENTIFIC, AND LEGAL PROBLEMS (1980); Baurer, Love
Canal: Common Law Approaches to a Modern Tragedy, 11 ENVT'L L. 133 (1980);
Milhollin, Long-Term Liability for Environmental Harm, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1979);
Pfennigstorf, supra note 15, at 347; Note, Strict Liability for Generators, Transporters,
and Disposers of Hazardous Wastes, 64 MINN. L. REV. 949 (1980); Note, Inactive or
Abandoned Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites: Coping With a Costly Past, 53 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1709 (1980).
87. Some inactive hazardous waste sites are nothing more than lots that were leased
for toxic storage or disposal from landowners who were unaware of the full consequences;
others are the result of surreptitious dumping without the landowner's knowledge or per-
mission. Interview with John T. Buchanan, supra note 75.
88. In some instances, the person responsible for dumping or disposing of hazardous
waste is an employee of the generator of the material. For example, employees of PCA
Industries, a North Carolina photograph developing company, were recently discovered
to have dumped chemical wastes at a remote farm near Pageland, South Carolina. Char-
lotte Observer, July 11, 1981, at 1A, col. 1. Because the generator normally has complete
control over the details of the work performed by his employees, he is usually liable for
their tortious acts under the doctrine of respondeat superior. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 26.6 (1956); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 70 (4th
ed. 1971). Employer liability under this doctrine requires that the tortious act occur
while the employee-servant is operating within the scope of his employment. Establish-
ing generator liability thus presents no particular problems when the dumper or disposer
is an employee of the generator. Establishing the employee-disposer's tort is a prerequi-
site to establishing the master's liability. As was indicated earlier, however, this in itself
may be difficult. See note 86 supra.
89. An independent contractor is "a person who contracts with another to do some-
thing for him but who is not controlled by the other nor subject to the other's right to
control with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of the undertaking."
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 2(3) (1958).
90. The independent contractor rule is commonly justified by observation that inde-
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pendent contractor rule, in effect, shields generator-employers
from liability for torts committed in performance of the work.
Several considerations militate against invocation of the in-
dependent contractor rule in cases concerning inactive and
abandoned hazardous waste sites. First, contrary to the rule's
view of the contractor and the employer as equally capable of
avoiding risks and bearing the costs arising from those risks,9 1
the disposal operator is in fact less likely than the generator to
be able to do so; applicability of the rule is, therefore, questiona-
ble in the hazardous waste context. Furthermore, despite the in-
tervention of an independent disposer, the enterprise of the con-
tracted service remains the generator's-he is the primary party
benefited by disposal of his waste.92 Finally, because the genera-
tor is in the better position to bear and distribute loss and to
control the factors producing loss, it is more appropriate that he,
rather thafi the innocent victims, bear the loss.93
As it stands, the independent contractor rule presents a for-
midable barrier to recovery in suits against hazardous waste gen-
erators. Numerous exceptions to the rule have developed," how-
ever, several of which may be available to victims of waste-
related injuries.
1. Inherently Dangerous Activities.-The "inherently dan-
gerous activity" exception, first carved out in Bower v. Peate"
and since adopted in most American jurisdictions, 6 holds an
employer liable for injuries negligently caused by the indepen-
dent contractor when the work performed by the independent
contractor is inherently dangerous, regardless of how skillfully
pendent contractors are likely to be able to satisfy tort judgments; that since the con-
tractor and not the employer has control over the work, he is in a superior position to
prevent injuries; and that a contractor is able to include the costs of preventive mea-
sures, insurance premiums, and tort judgments in his business costs and pass them on to
his customers. 51 U. COLO. L. Rav. 275, 277-78 (1980).
91. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and the Administration of Risk, 38 YALE L.J. 584,
599 (1929).
92. 31 VAND. L. REV. 414, 416 (1978).
93. Majestic Realty Ass'n v. Toti Contracting Co., 30 N.J. 425, 432-33, 153 A.2d 321,
324-25 (1959).
94. The Restatement (Second) of Torts lists twenty-four exceptions to the rule. RE-
STATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs §§ 410-29 (1965).
95. 1 Q.B.D. 321 (1876).
96. For a listing of these jurisdictions, see Morris, Torts of an Independent Con-
tractor, 29 ILL. L. REv. 339, 349 (1934).
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the work is done.97 This exception is based on the view that
when work involves an unusual danger to third persons, a party
should not be able to escape liability merely by hiring an inde-
pendent contractor to do the work.98
Hazardous waste disposal should qualify as an inherently
dangerous activity. Several commentators have noted that waste
disposal is dangerous to the extent that no precautions can
render it completely safe.99 Furthermore, the development of
funds 00 and financial responsibility requirements0 1 to assure
the availability of resources to clean up releases from properly
operated and permitted disposal facilities reflects a recognition
by legislative and regulatory bodies that even state of the art
disposal practices present hazards.
When forced to distinguish between inherently dangerous
activities and merely dangerous activities, however, courts have
reached inconsistent results. For example, while work with high-
ly flammable substances10 2 and coal mining 03 have been deemed
not inherently dangerous, activities such as highway construc-
tion104 and painting above a sidewalk 0 5 have been considered in-
herently dangerous.
The exception's applicability to hazardous waste contingen-
97. The difficulty inherent in establishing the negligence of the disposal contractor
in hazardous waste litigation limits at the outset the availability of this exception. See
note 86 supra. Another exception to the independent contractor rule, the "ul-
trahazardous activities" exception, which in effect imposes strict liability upon employ-
ers, holds the employer liable for injuries that arise out of ultrahazardous work per-
formed by a contractor regardless of whether the injuries are associated with a negligent
act. "Ultrahazardous" contemplates a greater degree of risk than "inherently dangerous,"
but the distinction is slight. 51 U. COLo. L. Rav. at 280. In any event, unless courts are
willing to classify hazardous waste activities as at least "inherently dangerous," the pros-
pects of an "ultrahazardous" designation are slim. The creation of Superfund, however,
suggests congressional recognition of the ultrahazardous nature of hazardous waste dis-
posal. See note 31 supra.
98. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Gulf Refining Co., 168 La. 73, 121 So. 578 (1929);
Bower v. Peate, 1 Q.B.D. 321 (1876).
99. See, e.g., Note, Strict Liability for Generators, supra note 85, at 974-77; 126
CONG. REc. H9462 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Gore).
100. See notes 27-41 and accompanying text supra.
101. See notes 21-26 and accompanying text supra.
102. Jennings v. Vincent's Adm'x, 284 Ky. 614, 145 S.W.2d 537 (1940).
103. Courtney v. Island Creek Coal Co., 474 F.2d 468 (6th Cir. 1973).
104. Schwartz v. Merola Bros. Constr. Corp., 290 N.Y. 145, 48 N.E.2d 299 (1943).
105. Rohlfs v. Weil, 271 N.Y. 444, 3 N.E.2d 588 (1936); contra, Press v. Penny, 242
Mo. 98, 145 S.W. 458 (1912).
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cies has been considered and rejected by at least one court. In
Ewell v. Petro Processors of Louisiana, Inc.,106 plaintiffs brought
an action against a hazardous waste disposal facility and nine of
its corporate customers for property damages and mental
anguish caused by release of toxic materials from the disposal
site. The contractor disposing of the waste was held liable for
negligently permitting the release, but liability was not extended
to the generators. The court followed the rule that a party can-
not avoid liability by hiring an independent contractor to per-
form inherently dangerous work, but stipulated that
[w]here an available safe method, which includes the taking of
adequate precautions, will render [the activity] at least ordina-
rily safe, and the work is done in an unsafe manner, the em-
ployer will be liable-if he has expressly or impliedly authorized
the particular manner which will render the work unsafe, and
not otherwise.
107
The court concluded that waste disposal activities, if properly
undertaken, can be safe and that hazardous waste disposal is ac-
cordingly not an inherently dangerous activity unless the genera-
tor authorizes a practice that renders the work unsafe.""8 Be-
cause the generators in Ewell had no apparent knowledge that
part of the disposal site was improperly constructed and, there-
fore, could not have authorized the deleterious condition, the
continued dumping of their wastes at the site was held not to be
an inherently dangerous activity.109
The requirement in Ewell of a showing of knowledge of a
defective condition at the site as a requisite for generator liabil-
ity presents a substantial barrier for hazardous waste plain-
tiffs.110 This particular dimension of the inherently dangerous
exception, however, has apparently not been followed in any ju-
risdiction other than Louisiana, the only civil-law state. Its sig-.
nificance, therefore, is doubtful. The court's determination that
hazardous waste disposal can be safely undertaken and is there-
106. 364 So.2d 604 (La. App. 1978).
107. Id. at 606-07.
108. Id. at 607.
109. Id. at 606-07.
110. Because structural defects at disposal sites are commonly latent in nature, the
disposer may be unaware of a leak until years after its occurrence. Even when discov-
ered, its presence is unlikely to be communicated to generator-customers.
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fore not inherently dangerous is nevertheless troublesome.
Taken with the general inconsistency of applications of the ex-
ception in other jurisdictions, this determination renders uncer-
tain the availability of the exception for inherently dangerous
activities as a means of circumventing the independent contrac-
tor rule in hazardous waste litigation."'
2. Incompetent Contractors.-A second means by which a
plaintiff might avoid the independent contractor rule is the "in-
competent contractor" exception. Although this exception has
appeal for hazardous waste cases, its application may be prob-
lematic. Generally stated, the "incompetent contractor" rule
holds that when a foreseeable risk of injury to others exists, un-
less an employer takes reasonable precautions, he has a duty "to
exercise reasonable care to select a competent, experienced, and
careful contractor with the proper equipment, and to provide, in
the contract or otherwise, for such precautions as reasonably ap-
pear to be called for." ' If the employer fails to exercise reason-
able care and a third party is subsequently injured because of
the contractor's negligence, the employer is liable for having
negligently selected an incompetent contractor.11 3 The effective-
ness of this exception in a given case depends on (1) whether
risk of injury was foreseeable to the employer, (2) whether the
contractor was in fact incompetent, (3) whether the employer
exercised reasonable care in selecting the contractor, and (4)
whether the employer took adequate precautions in contracting
for the performance of the work.
Because the hazardous characteristics and potential effects
of many chemicals used in manufacturing processes have been
111. In contrast to the restrictive interpretation of the inherently dangerous excep-
tion in Ewell, the application of the exception in a recent Colorado case offers hope for
hazardous waste victims. In Western Stock Center, Inc. v. Sevit, Inc., 578 P.2d 1045
(Colo. 1978), the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that to be inherently dangerous, an
activity need not be extremely dangerous but must present only a foreseeable and signifi-
cant risk of harm to others if not properly carried out. Whether courts in other jurisdic-
tions will follow the restrictive lead of Ewell or the broader approach of Sevit in future
hazardous waste litigation remains to be seen.
112. W. PROSSER, supra note 88, § 71, at 469.
113. Though called an exception, the incompetent contractor approach actually es-
tablishes direct negligenc of the employer. This "exception" is very similar to the doc-
trine of negligent entrustment, which states that a person who supplies an instrumental-
ity to another "knowing that it will likely be used in a dangerous fashion is subject to
liability for injuries proximately caused thereby." Lanterman v. Wilson, 277 Md. 364,
370, 354 A.2d 432, 435 (1976).
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recognized for some time114 and because safety precautions
taken at laboratory and manufacturing levels typically have re-
flected cognizance of the potential hazards of chemicals,11 5 the
foreseeability of harm to third parties in the event of misman-
agement of chemical wastes should not be difficult to prove.
Similarly, because hazardous waste disposal operations were, un-
til recently, often technically unsophisticated and financially ir-
responsible businesses,116 establishing a contractor's incompe-
tence might not be burdensome.
117
Whether reasonable care was taken in selecting a contractor
is a more difficult question. Courts generally agree that if an em-
ployer had actual knowledge of the contractor's incompetence at
the time of the contract, liability follows as a matter of course. 118
Some courts have reached the same conclusion when the con-
tractor's reputation was sufficiently bad to put the employer on
constructive notice of his incompetence. 19 When the contrac-
tor's incompetence is less apparent, however, there is little
agreement on what constitutes reasonableness in selection. Al-
though a few courts have held that, in some instances, an em-
ployer has an affirmative duty of inquiry regarding the contrac-
tor's competence1 20  or the condition of the contractor's
equipment,1 21 the majority have found the selection reasonable
if the contractor is reputed to be experienced in the work re-
quired of him 122 or if the contractor merely represents himself as
114. See Baurer, supra note 86, at 143 (citing H. STRAUss, HANDBOOK FOR CHEMICAL
TECHNICIANS § 10-6 (1976)).
115. Id. A possible argument against this is that because the migratory effects of
chemicals in soil have become fully understood only within the last decade, the conse-
quences of improper disposal were neither fully foreseeable nor fully appreciated at the
time of disposal. Interview with Jim Ferguson, Geologist, South Carolina Dep't of Health
and Environmental Control, in Columbia, S.C. (Aug. 4, 1981).
116. See note 6 supra.
117. Several recent cases have suggested that financial irresponsibility alone consti-
tutes incompetency in a contractor. See Bepker v. Interstate Properties, 569 F.2d 1203
(3d Cir. 1977); Majestic Realty Ass'n v. Toti Contracting Co., 30 N.J. 425, 153 A.2d 321
(1959).
118. E.g., Huntt v. McNamee, 141 F. 293 (4th Cir. 1905); Ozan Lumber Co. v. Mc-
Neely, 214 Ark. 657, 217 S.W.2d 341 (1949).
119. E.g., Skelton v. Fekete, 120 Cal. App. 2d 401, 261 P.2d 339 (1953).
120. E.g., Lewis v. Columbus Hosp., 1 A.D.2d 444, 151 N.Y.S.2d 39.1 (1956).
121. E.g., Kuhn v. P.J. Carlin Constr. Co., 154 Misc. 892, 278 N.Y.S. 635 (Sup. Ct.
1935).
122. E.g., Carr v. Stevens, 295 F. 701 (D.C. Md. 1924).
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experienced and competent in his field.1 23 Thus, unless a hazard-
ous waste generator had reason to know of a disposal contrac-
tor's incompetence at the time of the contract, negligent selec-
tion may be difficult to establish. 24
A plaintiff may also have difficulty showing that a generator
failed to take adequate precautions. Generally if a party is aware
of risks inherent in the performance of the work to be con-
tracted, he has a duty to include precautionary provisions in his
agreement with the contractor. The cases suggest that at a mini-
mum, an employer must advise the contractor of any peculiar
risks in the work.1 25 Some courts have further held that the em-
ployer must expressly impose upon the contractor a duty to ex-
ercise reasonable care in the performance of the work.1 28 Be-
cause hazardous waste generators possess a special knowledge of
the risks presented by their waste,1 27 they should be expected to
exercise these precautions in contracting and should be held lia-
ble for failure to do so. Notably, although a breach of this duty
by a generator may be evident in some hazardous waste cases, in
other cases the improper disposal of wastes may be attributable
not to the generator's failure to take adequate precautions but
to a profiteering contractor's disposal of the wastes in a manner
inconsistent with his contractual obligations. 28
3. By-Products Liability.-A third possible means of avoid-
ing the independent contractor rule is a "by-products liability"
theory that would hold generators directly and strictly liable for
123. E.g., Claussen v. Hanschke, 93 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
124. Generally, the question of the employer's negligent selection will be resolved by
the trier of fact. Mooney v. Stainless, Inc., 338 F.2d 127, 136 (6th Cir. 1964). Conse-
quently, a jury might be inclined to find the generator negligent rather than allow the
innocent victim to go without remedy.
125. E.g., Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Kelton, 79 Ariz. 126, 285 P.2d 168
(1955); State Highway and Public Works Comm'n v. Diamond Steamship Transp. Corp.,
266 N.C. 371, 38 S.E.2d 214 (1946). It should be noted that the determination of the
reasonableness of the generator's selection is ultimately a jury question, which in hazard-
ous waste litigation probably inures to the benefit of the innocent victim-plaintiff.
126. E.g., Koopman v. Mansolf, 51 Mont. 48, 149 P. 491 (1915).
127. See notes 114-115 and accompanying text supra.
128. For example, Chem-Dyne Corporation, an Ohio concern, allegedly arranged
with generators to dispose of its wastes at a secure hazardous waste disposal site, calcu-
lated the cost of proper disposal in its fee, and then reaped a large profit by dumping the
wastes indiscriminately and in derogation of its contractual obligations. Winston-Salem
Sentinel, Jul. 24, 1980, at 1, col. 4.
1982] 567
25
Fulton: Hazardous Waste: Third-Party Compensation for Contingencies Arisi
Published by Scholar Commons, 1982
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
harms caused by unreasonably dangerous wastes. 29 Because
strict products liability generally is a statutory rather than a
common-law remedy,13 0 a cause of action in by-products liability
probably requires either legislative endorsement or judicial ex-
pansion of products liability theory to include the by-products
of manufacturing processes that produce goods for sale.
Strict products liability applies to "[o]ne who sells any
product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property . . . for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his prop-
erty ... 13 Policies underlying the law of products liability are
clearly applicable to hazardous waste-related injuries: (1) costs
of injury that might overwhelm individual victims are passed to
the manufacturers who can spread the loss to customers through
higher prices, and (2) primary responsibility for harm is fixed on
the party who introduced the risk into the marketplace.
1 82
To be applicable to hazardous waste cases, however, prod-
ucts liability theory requires substantial expansion. Not only
must the definition of "products sale" be interpreted broadly to
include by-products or wastes generated in the manufacture of
goods for sale, but "user and consumer" must be construed to
include waste victims who do not literally use or consume
wastes.133 Further, a major shift in emphasis away from the inju-
rious product itself to the entire manufacturing process is re-
quired. 13 4 Finally, because hazardous waste contingencies often
injure a large number of persons,135 the potential scope of gener-
ator liability might exceed that contemplated by products liabil-
129. See Note, Strict Liability for Generators, supra note 86, at 977-85, for a more
complete discussion of this theory.
130. For example, in Hatfield v. Atlas Enterprises, Inc., 274 S.C. 247, 262 S.E.2d 900
(1980), the South Carolina Supreme Court held that prior to 1974, the year the South
Carolina Legislature codified section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, strict
products liability did not exist as a common-law remedy in the state. Id. at 248, 262
S.E.2d at 901.
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965).
132. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441
(1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
133. Note, Strict Liability for Generators, supra note 86, at 979-81. In many juris-
dictions, however, "user and consumer" has been liberally interpreted to include inno-
cent bystanders. Thus, inclusion of hazardous waste victims in this class may not do
great violence to the rule. Id. at 981.
134. Id. at 980.
135. See the discussion of the Love Canal incident at note 11 supra.
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ity statutes. Given the extent of expansion necessary to make
products liability theory applicable to hazardous waste cases, by-
products liability may not be a practicable basis for generator
liability.
C. Causation
Assuming that a hazardous waste plaintiff is able to avoid
statute of limitation problems and can make a case against the
generators of the injury-producing wastes under one of the
above-mentioned theories, he still must establish causation. In
the context of hazardous waste litigation, the causation require-
ment comprises two separate elements: (1) the plaintiff must es-
tablish that his injury was, in fact, caused by exposure to haz-
ardous wastes, and (2) he must show that the defendant was the
source of the pollution that caused his injury.
The first element is a problem when no proof exists that the
released waste is capable of causing in humans the particular
harm suffered by the plaintiff and when the plaintiff's injury
may be equally attributable to other sources, such as workplace
hazards, air pollution, diet, or genetic history. Causation in this
context is a factual determination made by the jury and is com-
monly based on expert and statistical proof.1386
The second element that a plaintiff must prove-that the
generator-defendant is the source of his injury-may be particu-
larly difficult in cases concerning inactive and abandoned haz-
ardous waste sites. The plaintiff may find himself in one of four
fact patterns: 1) the wastes that caused the injury were pro-
duced by a single, identifiable generator; 2) an identified group
of generators produced the waste, one or more of whom may be
responsible for the plaintiff's injury; 3) some of the generators
who produced the waste can be identified but others cannot; or
4) the site is abandoned and none of the waste's generators can
be identified.
137
The first situation is, of course, the simplest and most ame-
nable to traditional tort analysis because only one possible de-
136. Rice, Pollution as a Nuisance: Problems, Prospects, and Proposals, in Toxic
TORTS 342, 355 (P. Rheingold ed. 1977). Superfund's provisions regarding epidemiologic
studies, health effect studies, and diagnostic studies reflect a desire on the part of Con-
gress to ease the substantial burden of showing causation. See note 32 supra.
137. Many variations of these basic patterns are possible.
1982]
27
Fulton: Hazardous Waste: Third-Party Compensation for Contingencies Arisi
Published by Scholar Commons, 1982
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
fendant exists. In the remaining fact patterns, a victim of haz-
ardous waste may in many cases be unable to identify the
generator directly responsible for his loss: many inactive and
abandoned waste sites contain wastes from multiple generators,
and some wastes produce injury while others do not.
In these circumstances, the traditional legal requirement
that a plaintiff prove his case against each individual defendant
by a fair preponderance of the evidence 8 is far more burden-
some than in the first fact pattern. When all possible defendants
are identified, however, as in the second fact pattern, and when
it is clear that each defendant may have contributed to or
caused the plaintiff's injury, many courts have found defendants
jointly and severally liable for the plaintiff's injury 89 because of
the manifest unfairness of "putting on the injured party the im-
possible burden of proving the specific shares of harm done by
each. '140 In several environmental cases141 analogous to hazard-
ous waste situations, courts have justified joint and several lia-
bility as follows:
[w]here the tortious acts of two or more wrongdoers join to
produce an indivisible injury, that is, an injury which from its
nature cannot be apportioned with reasonable certainty to the
individual wrongdoers, all of the wrongdoers will be held
jointly and severally liable for the entire damages and the in-
jured party may proceed to judgment against any one sepa-
rately or against all in one suit.142
The named defendant or defendants against whom full judg-
ment is entered are then entitled, under the theory of contribu-
tion, to recover from each guilty party that part of the damages
for which each is responsible. 43 Joint and several liability thus
138. Harley, Proof of Causation in Environmental Litigation, in Toxic TORTS 406,
406 (P. Rehingold ed. 1977).
139. E.g., Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944) (because plaintiff
was injured while under anesthesia and could not identify the tortfeasor, all hospital
staff in the room at the time were found jointly liable).
140. Maddux v. Donaldson, 362 Mich. 425, 430, 108 N.W.2d 33, 36 (1961) (citing
Wigmore, Joint-Tortfeasors and Severance of Damages: Making the Innocent Party
Suffer without Redress, 17 ILL. L. R.v. 458, 459 (1923)).
141. E.g., Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Div., 495 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1974); Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Hardee, 189 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1951).
142. Landers v. East Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 251, 256, 248 S.W.2d
731, 734 (1952).
143. 126 CONG. REC. H9463 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Gore).
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shifts the burden of apportioning loss from the innocent plaintiff
to the culpable defendants. Because of the impracticality in
many cases of apportioning fault for hazardous waste-related in-
juries,"" joint and several liability may be available when all of
the generators that could be responsible for the harm are known.
Circumstances in which several generators, but not all, are
identifiable-as in the third fact pattern-present a more diffi-
cult case for application of joint and several liability. When the
majority of the generators who have contributed to a problem
are ascertainable, the imposition of joint and several liability
may produce little more hardship than its application when all
sources are identified: courts can apportion the damages, includ-
ing that portion attributable to unascertained generators, among
the identified majority of generators. When only a few of many
hazardous waste generators can be identified, however, applica-
tion of joint and several liability may produce an unwarranted
result. Because the costs associated with problem hazardous
waste sites can be enormous and because identified generators
may themselves experience difficulty locating other responsible
parties with whom the loss can be shared, joint and several lia-
bility may force upon a few defendants the responsibility for a
huge loss to which they contributed only minimally-a burden
that may be sufficient to drive them out of business. Perhaps for
this reason, cases to date have imposed joint and several liability
only in circumstances in which all possible defendants are
identifiable.
If application of joint and several liability is questionable in
cases in which fewer than all waste generators can be identified,
its application in situations similar to the fourth fact pat-
tern-when the disposal site is abandoned and no generators can
be identified-would appear to be totally unsuitable. Neverthe-
less the California Supreme Court's application of joint liability
in the recent case of Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories4 5 suggests a
ground for relief for hazardous waste victims in such a situation.
In Sindell, a products liability action, plaintiff brought suit
against eleven drug companies on behalf of a class of women
who had been injured as a result of their mothers' ingesting a
latently carcinogenic drug during pregnancy. Although the
144. Id. at H9464.
145. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980).
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plaintiff was unable to identify the manufacturer of the precise
product her mother had consumed years before, the court, recog-
nizing the general rule that "the imposition of liability depends
upon a showing by the plaintiff, that his or her injuries were
caused by the act of the defendant or by an instrumentality
under the defendant's control,"1 46 noted that the defendants
were better able to bear the cost of the injuries and were in the
better position to prevent defects and to warn of harmful effects.
The court then concluded that "as between an innocent plaintiff
and negligent defendants, the latter should bear the cost of the
injury." 147 The court stated that, because the plaintiff named in
the action "the manufacturers of a substantial share- of the...
[drug] her mother might have taken," each defendant would be
"held liable for the proportion of the judgment represented by
its share of that market unless it demonstrates that it could not
have made the product which caused plaintiff's injuries. 1 48
The "market-share" joint liability approach used in Sindell,
which represents a modification of the "alternative liability"
theory exemplified by the noted case of Summers v. Tice,1 49 has
obvious appeal for the victims of abandoned hazardous waste
sites when a large number of possible tortfeasors exists, any of
whom may have produced the injury-causing substance. Thus, a
victim of an abandoned site might be entitled to recover under
an analogous "waste-share" theory if he can isolate the chemi-
cal(s) responsible for his injury and can name in an action the
generators who, at the time of disposal activities at the problem
disposal site, produced a substantial share of waste containing
the injurious chemical(s). Each generator might then be held lia-
146. Id. at 597, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
147. Id. at 610-11, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
148. Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
149. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) (plaintiff was injured when two hunters shot in
his direction but it could not be determined which hunter fired the shot that caused the
injury). The alternative liability theory has been stated as follows:
Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved that harni
has been caused to the plaintiff by only one of them, but there is uncertainty
as to which one has caused it, the burden is upon each such actor to prove that
he has not caused the harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 433B(3) (1965). The court in Sindell rejected strict
application of the alternative liability theory because not all of the possible defendants
were before the court. 26 Cal. 3d at 602, 607 P.2d at 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139. A second
theory rejected by the court is the "enterprise liability" theory. Id. at 609, 607 P.2d at
935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
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ble for the proportion of the judgment that reflects his share of
the production of the chemical waste at the time the site was
operating, absent proof that he could not be responsible for the
waste.
Application of the waste-share approach in hazardous waste
litigation is nevertheless more complex than in Sindell. The re-
quirement that the plaintiff name in the suit those parties pro-
ducing a substantial share of the injurious substance poses
unique problems in suits concerning abandoned waste sites, be-
cause identification of those generators who produced the injuri-
ous chemicals at the time the disposal site was in operation may
be difficult. Furthermore, while in Sindell the production of the
eleven named defendants constituted as much as 90% of the to-
tal amount of the drug marketed, the huge number of hazardous
waste generators might necessitate the joining of hundreds of
defendants in order to meet the "substantial share"
requirement.
150
The Sindell market-share theory has been either impliedly
or expressly rejected in several jurisdictions.151 One of the most
recent cases to reject the theory is Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co.,15 in
which the United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina, considering facts nearly identical to those in Sindell,
53
granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and noted
that, although the plaintiff failed to make a case for application
of the market-share theory, that theory "represents a rejection
of 'over 100 years of tort law which required that before tort
liability was imposed a "matching" of defendant's conduct and
plaintiff's injury was absolutely essential."' 1" The court con-
cluded that a plaintiff "has not only the burden of proving negli-
gence but also the burden of proving that the injury or damage
was caused by the actionable conduct of the particular
150. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
151. See Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Namm v. Charles
Frost & Co., 178 N.J. Super. 19, 427 A.2d 1121 (1981); Lyons v. Premo Pharmaceutical
Labs, Inc., 170 N.J. Super. 183, 406 A.2d 185, cert. denied, 82 N.J. 291, 412 A.2d 774
(1979).
152. 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981).
153. Plaintiff, like the plaintiff in Sindell, was a victim of DES ingested by her
mother during pregnancy. Id. at 1006.
154. Id. at 1018 (quoting Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 616, 607 P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr.
at 147).
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defendant. '" 155
In sum, the rejection of the market-share theory in some
jurisdictions and the practical problems that are associated with
its application in cases concerning abandonea hazardous waste
sites render uncertain its utility in hazardous waste litigaton.
V. CONCLUSION
Several vehicles exist by which the problem of third-party
compensation for waste-related injuries might be resolved. The
creation of a state or federal statutory cause of action, similar to
those currently in effect in Oregon and Alaska,156 that inures to
the benefit of hazardous waste victims is one possible approach.
To be effective, however, the cause of action should avoid the
difficulties inherent in litigating injuries caused by inactive and
abandoned sites. An effective cause of action should provide a
reasonable statute of limitation;5 7 it should sound in strict lia-
bility and be made actionable against both disposal contractors
and generators; and it should diminish the plaintiff's burden of
proving that a causal relation exists between the plaintiff's in-
jury and the pollution 58 and that the defendant was the source
of the plaintiff's injury.
155. Id. at 1018.
156. See notes 36-40 and accompanying text supra.
157. The limitation period should run from the date the injury or the causal connec-
tion between the injury and the pollutant is discovered, rather than from an earlier date.
A statute of limitation was recently proposed in New York that would have the desired
effect. It requires that an action be brought "within three years from the date of [the]
injury, or ... within two years from the earlier of either date of the discovery ... or
from the date of discovery of fact which would reasonably lead to such discovery." NEw
YORK ENVIRONMENTAL NEws, Apr. 30, 1981, at 5 (quoting New York bill A.2572).
158. The causation requirement might be ameliorated as follows:
Notwithstanding the ordinary requirements for proof of cause in fact or proxi-
mate cause of damage, injury, or loss, a discharge, release or disposal shall be
presumed to have caused the injury or disease complained of and the associ-
ated medical expenses if a plaintiff seeking damages under this subsection of-
fers evidence tending to establish a reasonable likelihood that (i) the injured or
diseased party was exposed to a hazardous substance found in a discharge, re-
lease, or disposal for which the defendant may be held liable under this sec-
tion, and (ii) such a hazardous substance of such a discharge, release or dispo-
sal could have caused the injury or disease of the class or type for which
medical expenses are sought.
Anderson, Superfund Proposed to Clean Up Hazardous Waste Disasters, 20 NAT. RE-
SOURCE J. 615, 622 (1980) (quoting S. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 125 CONG. REc. S9179, §
4(c)(2)(A) (daily ed. July 11, 1979)).
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Altering the requirement that the plaintiff prove that each
defendant was a source of the injury may be difficult. The impo-
sition of joint and several liability is one solution to the problem
from the plaintiff's standpoint; yet in some instances, this impo-
sition may work an injustice from the generator's perspective. A
suggested solution to this apparent conflict is to hold generators
jointly and severally liable but limit the extent of their individ-
ual liabilities. Emergency appropriations from tax revenues
might be used to cover any losses in excess of the statutory ceil-
ing.159 This approach might ease the plaintiff's burden without
unnecessarily forcing generators out of business. This approach,
however, would shift part of the burden of paying the costs of
hazardous waste pollution from those who have benefited from
the injurious activity to the tax-paying public, perhaps an un-
warranted result.
This economic distortion and the possibility that even a
carefully drafted cause of action may fail to provide relief for
abandoned site victims60 make an administrative compensation
fund, similar to those in South Carolina and New Jersey,161 at-
tractive as an alternative means of assuring third-party recovery
for hazardous waste injuries. Because state funds of this type
serve a purpose not contemplated by Superfund, they might not
be preempted, even though financed by taxes or fees levied
against chemical and waste management industries. Alterna-
tively, the Superfund legislation could be amended to provide
for third-party relief, or a separate federal fund could be estab-
lished for this purpose.
A third-party compensation fund with relaxed causation
159. The Price-Anderson Act, Pub. L. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2210 (1976)), is designed in part to assure the availability of compensation for
third-party victims in the event of a nuclear accident. Lowenstein, The Price-Anderson
Act: An Imaginative Approach to Public Liability Concerns, 12 FORUM 594, 597 (1976-
77), is instructive regarding this approach. The Act establishes a liability ceiling of $60
million for nuclear power generators and provides that the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion will provide additional indemnity up to $500 million.
160. When a site has been abandoned, the disposal contractor is unavailable for
questioning regarding the generators with whom he transacted business. Thus, unless the
market-share theory of Sindell is applied, which, as indicated before, may be unwieldy in
the hazardous waste area, there will probably be no defendants against whom a claim
can be asserted. See notes 144-49 and accompanying text supra.
161. See notes 41-46 and accompanying text supra.
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standards6 2 may be made readily available to all legitimately in-
jured hazardous waste victims. Compensatory expenditures from
such a fund can be made recoverable from identifiable parties
connected with problem sites, and, in the event that' no party
can be identified with a site, the fund itself could absorb the
loss. Because a compensation fund can be financed by and
recouped from the chemical industry, the economic burden of
problem sites appropriately falls on that segment of society that
has reaped the benefits of past neglect, the chemical industi-y
and its consumers.
As discussed above, several of the proposed Superfund
packages considered by Congress provided this kind of adminis-
trative relief for private parties, but the level at which the fund
would have to be maintained in order to compensate private
parties persuaded Congress to abandon the prospect. 16 3 This ob-
jection might be overcome by limiting the amount recoverable
from the fund, as exemplified by the South Carolina Hazardous
Waste Fund,164 which limits recovery to $500,000 per claim-
ant. 6 5 Notably, recipients of fund proceeds apparently do not
sacrifice their right to pursue further private actions in the event
that the fund fails to provide full recovery.1 66
Viable approaches appear to exist by which state legisla-
tures or Congress can resolve the problem of compensating
third-party victims of inactive and abandoned hazardous waste
sites. It seems manifestly unjust that innocent victims should
suffer without remedy, bearing individually the huge costs of
hazardous waste pollution, when mechanisms exist whereby
these costs can be shifted to the sector of society that benefited
from the injurious activity. Hazardous waste legislation that is
more protective of third-party victims of inactive and aban-
doned waste sites is needed.
Colin Scott Cole Fulton
162. See.note 157 supra.
163. See notes 33 & 34 and accompanying text supra.
164. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-56-160 to -190 (Supp. 1980).
165. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envt'l Control R., S.C. CODE ANN. (R. & REG.) 61-79.5
C.(2)(e) (Supp. 1980).
166. Id.
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